The perils of genetics

Laurence Boyce at Lib Dem Voice offers us a good argument that genetics is not irrelevant to the way we turn out, but that this raises fears, particularly on the left.

So why all the discomfort? Pinker sets out four “fears” that might make us hesitate in the face of what the science is increasingly telling us. These are the fear of inequality, imperfectibility, determinism, and nihilism. I can’t possibly do justice to all of these – you’ll have to read the book – but the fear of inequality is probably the one which most offends left-wing sensibilities.

There is a great deal of heat over the suggestion that genetic differences between groups would justify discrimination on the basis of group membership. It is clear to me that political equality is a moral principle, not a consequence of us being "born equal" in any sense. Clearly we are not born equal - genetic variation within groups is not disputed. Don't base a good princple on a false premise unless you are trying to oppose it.

But it is vital, one opponent of discrimination would argue, that we oppose the idea that groups may differ genetically one from another, because this would justify prejudice.

So far, so wrong. It is frankly stupid to judge any individual based on group memberships (sex, race, class, shoe size, which group do you choose?) whether there are group differences or not, because all group differences are swamped by individual variation within groups.

However, beneath this, there is some substance in the warning. If there is a genetic difference on average between two groups, this may explain different outcomes on average. This explanation may even be - or seem - sufficient to account for the whole difference of outcome, suggesting that there is no discrimination at work.

So what theories of genetic difference between groups threaten is not the moral principle that people should be treated equitably and on their own merits; rather it is the evidence that disadvantaged groups are indeed discriminated against.

How do we respond to this? Well I would argue that this evidence was never terribly good in the first place. It doesn't, for instance, deal with the likelihood that people with different group identities may make different choices on average. Buddhists may choose to become monks with no possessions and this does not mean that the economic system discriminates against Buddhists.

Much better evidence comes from blind controlled trials; from differences in hiring and marking rates where the name and picture of the candidate are not available. Unfortunately this is not always possible. Still, it is not as if it is any secret. I have heard an employer admit that he won't hire women because they might get pregnant. Others have said that they won't hire disabled people because they might get sued for some technical breach of a complex accessibility law. Is there really such a lack of evidence for discrimination that we must die in a ditch over the weakest of it? No.

Inequality of outcomes between groups is a red flag, it warns us that discrimination is likely to be afoot. We should then find that discrimination and try to stop it. In every case it is a crime against some individual - and if we begin to see it more like this and less as a crime against some group identity, so much the better. Ultimately, groups identities are artificial, and group outcomes don't matter, so long as all individuals are respected and not discriminated against.

Reinventing the State Chapter 2: Equality Matters

Here, Duncan Brack advocates the pursuit of equality, by which he means a significant reduction in inequality of outcome. The mathematician in me rails against such abuse of the word equality, but I will live with it. He calls the idea of equality of opportunity a get out, which I think is a little unfair. Opportunity is a kind of outcome that gives rise to further outcomes. So it deserves special attention because investments in opportunity have a higher payoff than investments in other outcomes.

Brack then spends some time going through statistics demonstrating the degree of inequality found in the UK, and recent trends. To be honest this all leaves me quite cold. The pertinent question would seem to me to be quite how awful it is living on Job Seeker's Allowance (eg £46.85 per week for ages 18-24), or Income Support. I don't see, to be honest, how this depends much on the sort of statistics that are generally quoted. Rather, it would depend on access to local amenities, the local of cost living, frugal habits and a stoical outlook.

I get suspicious when an appeal to moral sentiment, well justified or not, gets dressed up in statistics in the hope of lending it scientific backing. For the record, I agree that living at these income levels is pretty awful for most people, and there is a good moral case for increasing these benefits, although it is probably a "political impossibility" for any party.

The old relative v absolute poverty chestnut is relevant here. Relevant, but simplistic. The single parent on benefits is much poorer than the average (relative), but much richer than many in the third world (relative again). And there are many important goods and services he or she cannot afford (absolute). Obviously by talking about inequality, Brack is focussing on relative poverty. Unfortunately in discussing the harm that results from poverty, little attempt is made to distinguish between the two.

Brack refers to John Rawls Difference Principle, that inequality could only be justified if it proved to be to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of society. This stems from Rawls' Veil of Ignorance, which is the idea that asks how you would design a society, in your own rational self-interest, if the veil hid from you any information about your position in that society, or your capacities for self-improvement.

I think the veil of ignorance is a brilliant idea for understanding ethics. But there are some questions that have to be asked here:

1. Does it really justify the difference principle? Might not the person in the veil be willing to take a bet, and risk a small disadvantage if they were poor, in return for a much greater chance to prosper if they were rich, or able and hard-working.
2. Do we really, as liberals, want our society to be entirely "designed"? Should it not be largely organic? In which case the question "how would you design..." carries a big bad assumption. I think we are OK on this point if we restrict ourselves to particular reforms, and propose nothing too comprehensive or revolutionary. cf Popper.
   
3. It is not clear how we solve problems of inter-generational equity. How much duty do we have to the people of the future to leave them a more prosperous society than we have? Hardly any, according to the difference principle - if the poorest of the future are any richer than the poorest of the present, then it is only the poorest of the present who matter according to the principle, and we should sacrifice all incentives in order to help them. But if we actually do that we will make the future poorer. So the difference principle seems to demand a carefully-balanced almost-stagnation.

Where does this leave us? I think the contrast between Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian capitalism might be characterised by the Anglo-Saxon being more of a gambler as in point 1. I think a big difference between the liberal and the authoritarian/marxist/neo-con etc is that we are suspicious of 'design' as in point 2. And finally point 3 reminds us to strike a sensible balance between the present and the future. As long as the future is somewhat richer than the present, has a good environment, and so on, we should largely trust it to look after itself. Too much focus on incentives leads to the brutality of the workhouse, benefiting future people who will be better off than us anyway: our need is greater. Too little focus on incentives, or the environment, and the problems are obvious.

That would be my perspective on Rawls, so I am unconvinced by an essay that simply takes the difference principle as read.

While of course most of the specific examples Brack gives on the problems of poverty are correct, I have one final complaint, and it is this. The only specific proposal to solve these problems seem to be higher taxes on the rich. What would this actually do? It could pay for an extra £10 on JSA, but Brack doesn't mention this. Or it could go to a less means-tested benefit like child benefit or a Citizens Income. Or it could be spent on education and Sure Start centres. Why, if all the problems are hitting the poor are the solutions not discussed at all? Do you want me to agree that we must do something, before you tell me what something you had in mind? We must do something! This is something! We must do it!

I believe equality matters, and we should pursue it. It is sometimes difficult to weigh up against other goals, but that is politics. So why did I find this chapter so unconvincing?

The Orange Booker Slur, part 4

Chapter 5: Liberal Economics and Social Justice by Vince Cable

That Cable advances economic liberalism can be guessed from the title. The question is whether he is weak on social liberalism. Pertinent to this are the questions of regulation and taxation.

Cable rejects a simple identification of more regulation as bad and left-wing, and the converse. Regulation is justified by market failures of which the world is full. "An almost infinite amount of regulation can be justified in these terms. The issue is a more practical one of whether government failures associated with regulation, and the cost of regulation, outweigh market failures and ... destroy ... entrepreneurial and competitive impulses..."

The question he asks is whether while many regulations in isolation are socially progressive and desirable, the cumulative effect is excessively onerous.

From these first principles it would be possible to defend both much higher and much lower levels of regulation than we currently suffer and enjoy. We are in the realm of tough political choices where philosophical first principles don't seem to help as much as they should. Perhaps Cable is willing to risk the suggestion of social illiberalism in order to emphasise the costs of regulation.

On taxation, Cable suggests a fiscal rule that the tax burden (or spend benefit?) should not exceed a figure around 40%. In terms of todays debate it would be that we should argue for fairer but not higher taxes. This has been criticised by some as a terribly right-wing position to take.

It seems to me that the support for tax rises or cuts comprises two constituencies. That which supports the rise or cut in question, and that which supports an ongoing programme of further cuts or rises of which this is only the beginning. The second constituency is an electoral bogeyman. It hurt Labour in 87 and 92 and the Conservatives in 05.

A fiscal rule seems a good way of promising that a tax proposal is not the thin end of a wedge. Of course much depends on what level the rule is set at. Does support for 40% rule in a 39% county make you a social liberal, and support for a 40% rule in a 41% country make you an economic liberal? Has this government turned me from one into the other in the last 5 years? The bounders! Perhaps social liberalism is the ultimate question of life the universe and everything, and the answer is 42%.

Of course I am being flippant. We are all, I hope, social and economic liberals. Deciding on taxation and spending priorities is another hard political choice that first principles do not inform so well as we would like. Even right and left wing do not summarise our response to this choice well, particularly if this prediction comes true. Big state or small state? Or, more precisely, a 40% state.